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"Fogg" Lingers Over the Supreme Court of
Florida
I.

INTRODUCTION

E.C. Fogg, III, Alan S. Fogg, and Elizabeth Lane Fogg owned a
parcel of unimproved land in Broward County, Florida.1 Prior to
1974, the tax assessor had classified the parcel as agricultural land,
but in 1974 he reclassified and reassessed the property as
nonagricultural.2
Through 1975, the Foggs carried out agricultural pursuits on
the property. 3 They leased part of the land for cattlegrazing, and
on the other part they boarded horses. The Foggs also carried out
activities indicative of an intent to develop the property. They
made contracts for sale, applied for rezoning, attended hearings
before the city council, applied for project approval by the South
Florida Regional Planning Council, conducted engineering studies,
'obtained approvals of solid waste plans, and secured approval for
bonds that the Hollywood Reclamation District was to issue. 4
The Foggs brought an action for a declaratory judgment that
they were using the property for agricultural purposes, and in the
same action, they sought injunctive relief to prevent the tax assessor from taxing the property at the higher nonagricultural value
for the years 1974 and 1975. The trial court denied the relief
sought and upheld the nonagricultural classification. The trial
court found that section 193.461(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes primarily controlled the outcome of the case.6 Subsection (4)(c) cre1. The facts were taken from Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1984), Fogg v.
Broward County, 397 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), and Fogg v. Broward County, No. 7413642 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 1978).
2. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1124.
3. Fogg v. Broward County, 397 So. 2d at 946. The tax assessor alleged that the agricultural use was merely "incidental" to development. Id.
4. Id.
5. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642.
6. Subsection (4)(c) states:
Sale of land for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural
assessment placed on the land shall create a presumption that such land is not
used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Upon a showing of special
circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued
in bona fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted.
FLA. STAT. § 193.461(4)(c) (1983). Subsection (4)(c) will be referred to as the "three times
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ates a rebuttable presumption that land is no longer used agriculturally once it has been sold for a purchase price that is three or
more times the agricultural assessment placed on the land. The
trial court found that the Foggs had sold the land at a price more
than three times the agricultural assessment and that they had not
successfully rebutted the statutory presumption.7 Additionally, the
trial court found that the land had been rezoned to a nonagricultural use at the request of the owner. Subsection (4)(a)31 creates a
presumption that land is no longer used agriculturally when, at the
owner's request, the land has been rezoned "nonagricultural."
Thus, subsection (4)(a)3 required the tax assessor to reclassify the
land to nonagricultural. Finally, pursuant to subsection (3)(b), 9
purchase price presumption."
7. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642, slip op. at 2. There are three possible explanations for the trial court's finding that a sale occurred. The trial court may have based its
holding on its determination that "[tlhe August contract of sale ... did close ...." Id. at
3. This justification for the court's holding is unlikely, however, because both parties agreed
that no closing took place. Thus the court's finding that a contract closed is apparently a
typographical error. See Answer Brief of Respondents on the Merits at 6, Markham v. Fogg,
458 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1984). Alternatively, the court may have determined that because a
contract purchaser holds equitable title to the property once the contract is signed, a sale,
for the purposes of section (4)(c), had occurred when the parties signed the contract for sale.
See Fogg v. Broward County, 397 So. 2d at 948. Finally, the trial court may have confused
the issue of whether a sale had occurred with the issue of the Foggs' good faith agricultural
use of the land, by determining that because the Foggs evidenced an intent to sell the land,
a sale had occurred for the purposes of subsection (4)(c). See infra text accompanying notes
97-100.
The trial court apparently found that the Foggs failed to rebut the "three times
purchase price presumption" because they intended to sell the property for development,
and thus they could not make the required showing under subsection (4)(c) that the land
was to be continued in bona fide agriculture. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642.
8. Subsection (4)(a)3 provides that "[t]he property appraiser shall reclassify . . .as
nonagricultural . . . [l]and that has been zoned to a nonagricultural use at the request of
the owner. . .. . FLA. STAT. § 193.461(4)(a)3 (1983). Subsection (4)(a)3 will be referred to as
the "rezoning presumption."
9. Subsection (3)(b) provides:
Subject to the restrictions set out in this section, only lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural. "Bona
fide agricultural purposes" means good faith commercial agricultural use of the
land. In determining whether the use of the land for agricultural purposes is
bona fide, the following factors may be taken into consideration:
(1) The length of time the land has been so utilized;
(2) Whether the use has been continuous;
(3) The purchase price paid;
(4) Size, as it relates to specific agricultural use;
(5) Whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently
and adequately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial
agricultural practices, including, without limitation, fertilizing, liming, tilling, mowing, reforesting, and other accepted agricultural
practices;
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which requires that only lands used primarily for good faith commercial agricultural use shall be classified agricultural, the trial
court found that the land should not be classified as agricultural
because the Foggs had not shown that they were using the land
primarily for agricultural purposes."0
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
decision. 1 In so doing, the Fourth District held that the "three
times purchase price presumption," applied only to completed
sales of realty and that, although the Foggs made numerous contracts to sell the land, they did not sell it. 2 The Fourth District
also held that although the land had been rezoned from agricultural to planned unit development, the "rezoning presumption"
did not require the tax assessor to reclassify the land as nonagricultural because the owners continued to use the property for agricultural purposes.' 3 Finally, the appellate court held that the evidence failed to support the trial court's finding that the owners
were not using the land primarily for bona fide agricultural
purposes.'
On certiorari, 15 the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the appellate court's decision.' 6 In accord with the appellate court, the
supreme court held that the "three times purchase price presumption" of subsection (4)(c) was not applicable to a property owner
who had not in fact sold the land.' 7 The supreme court, however,
quashed the lower court's opinion because it found the evidence
sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding that the Foggs had
(6) Whether such land is under lease and, if so, the effective length,
terms, and conditions of the lease; and
(7) Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable.
Id. at (3)(b). Subsection (3)(b) will be referred to as the "good faith commercial agricultural
use" subsection.
10. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642, slip op. at 4-7.
11. Fogg v. Broward County, 397 So. 2d at 950.
12. Id. at 948-49. The Fourth District determined that the "Legislature [did not intend] to bar land from an agricultural classification for tax purposes upon the mere signing
of a contract to sell it." Id. at 949.
13. Id. at 949-50.
14. Id. at 950. The Fourth District held that the test employed in determining bona
fide agricultural use was actual use. Id.
15. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted certiorari pursuant to article V, section
3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution because the Fourth District Court of Appeal's holding in
Fogg directly conflicted with the Third District's holding in Lauderdale v. Blake, 351 So. 2d
742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The Blake court relied on section (4)(a)3 the "rezoning presumption" to uphold the denial of agricultural classification where the landowners rezoned their
property from agricultural to a multiple family district. Id. at 743.
16. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1127.
17. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1125.
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used the land primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes, and
thus, the Foggs presented insufficient evidence to rebut subsection
(4)(a)3, the "rezoning presumption." Moreover, the court upheld
the constitutionality of subsection (4)(a)3 under both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Florida Constitution. 18
II.
A.

PERSPECTIVE

Constitutional and Legislative History of the Greenbelt Law

In 1959, in response to the threat of "urban sprawl,"' 9 the
Florida Legislature enacted section 193.201 of the Florida Statutes.2 0 This law gave preferential tax treatment to land used exclusively for agriculture purposes.2 Section 193.201 was the precursor
of Florida's greenbelt law, section 193.461.22
Prior to the enactment of the 1968 constitution, which recognizes the right of the legislature to enact preferential agricultural
assessment statutes,23 the legislature passed Florida's current
18. The Foggs challenged the constitutionality of section (4)(a)3 for the first time on
appeal in the district court. Fogg v. Broward County, 397 So. 2d at 949. The district court
declined to resolve the constitutional issues presented because the Foggs failed to assert
them at the trial level. Id.
19. The legislature observed that real estate development that increased assessment of
agricultural lands to unreasonable and unprofitable proportions forced farmers to abandon
their livelihood. 1959 Fla. Laws ch. 59-226 (Preamble of House Bill No. 831).
20. FLA. STAT. § 193.201 (1959) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1983)).
21. Id. Preferential assessment refers to lands that are assessed at a more favorable tax
rate than other lands for various policy reasons. With respect to agricultural land, the justification given for the special treatment falls into two categories:
The first argument is the farmland preservation theory. Agricultural land tax
breaks save farmers money and make agricultural activities more profitable, consequently giving farmers an economic incentive to continue farming. The second
justification given for treating farmers differently for tax purposes is that agricultural activities do not make demands on governmental services that urban
land uses make. Farmers are therefore entitled to tax breaks because they otherwise would be paying more than their fair share of the costs of governmental
services.
Juergensmeyer, FarmlandPreservation:A Vital Agricultural Law Issue for the 1980's, 21
WASHBURN L.J. 443, 466 (1982).
22. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1983). "A 'greenbelt' is an area of land bordering on an urban
center that has deliberately been preserved in its undeveloped state; the land is not used at
all or is used only for agriculture." Note, Florida Greenbelts: Preservationof Public and
Private Interests, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 142, 142 n.1 (1974). For an in-depth discussion of section 193.201, see Wershow, Agricultural Zoning in Florida-ItsImplications and Problems,
13 U. FLA. L. REV. 479 (1960).
23. Prior to the enactment of the new constitution, the Supreme Court of Florida, in
Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963), sanctioned preferential assessment for agricultural lands. The court articulated its rationale two years later in Lanier v. Overstreet, 175
So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965). It said: "The organic requirements of Section 1 of Article IX do not
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greenbelt law. 24 The present constitution states that "[algricultural
land . . . may be classified by general law and assessed solely on
the basis-of character or use." 25 Pursuant to this constitutional
provision, Florida's greenbelt statute attempts to balance conflicting agricultural and urban interests "to assure an orderly development of the community ' 2 and "to promote agricultural use of the
27
land."
The Supreme Court of Florida has espoused a similar purpose
with respect to the most recent articulation of the greenbelt law:
[T]he reduced taxation for farmland is based on a legislative determination that agriculture cannot reasonably be expected to
withstand the tax burden of the highest and best use to which
such land might be put. The agricultural assessed value is the
amount that could be invested with a reasonable expectation of
an annual return to the owner similar to what he would gain
from other commercial enterprises with similar risks, liquidity,
degree and level of management, etc.2 8
In other words, "the primary legislative purpose of the 'green belt'
law [is] to encourage continued agricultural use by assisting a
farmer-owner to make a reasonable profit from such use, vis-a-vis,
a like profit should it be put to nonagricultural use."'2 9
B.

Case Law-the Greenbelt Statute Interpreted

Historically, Florida courts have interpreted the greenbelt law
with relative consistency. The courts had in the past held uniformly that agricultural use was the primary criterion of the greenbelt law and that the speculative intent of the landowner was irrelevant. 80 Matheson v. Elcook 1 is an early articulation of this
forbid the classification of property in providing for the 'just valuation' of taxable property;
on the contrary, the organic mandate to the legislature to 'prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation of all property' contemplates such classifications .... " Id. at 523.
Chief Justice Drew, joined by Justices Thomas and O'Connell, authored a vigorous dissent
in Overstreet, arguing that the legislature had no power to grant exemptions from taxation
to certain classes. Id. at 525-26 (Drew, C. J., dissenting).
24. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1983).
25. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(a).
26. Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 1972).
27. Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 1979).
28. Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1976).
29. Walden v. Tuten, 347 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
30. See, e.g., Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979); Roden v. K
& K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978); Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368
(Fla. 1977); Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971); Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So. 2d 665
(Fla. 1971); Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965); The Glades, Inc. v. Colding, 422
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principle. The Matheson court held that the greenbelt statute did
not require the agricultural use of the land to be efficient or profitable.3 2 The tax assessor in Matheson alleged that the court's holding would result in speculators taking advantage of the tax benefits
by farming their land merely to obtain favorable tax treatment
rather than to pursue long-term agricultural use. The Third District pointed out, however, that the tax advantages under the
greenbelt law accrued where there was a bona fide agricultural use
of the land.33
In Hausman v. Rudkin, 34 the Fourth District expressly ac-

knowledged that the landowners had purchased the property as a
speculative venture. The Hausman court held that: "As we interpret the statute, the intent of the title holder and his desire for
capital gain are immaterial to the application of agricultural zoning. The favorable tax treatment provided by the statute is predicated on land use, that is, physical activity conducted on the
land.

'3 5

In the same year that the Fourth District decided Haus-

man, the Second District, in Schooley v. Wetstone, determined
that a zoning board's contention that the land was used primarily
for speculation was "of no consequence" where 3the
actual use of
7
the land was for bona fide agricultural purposes.
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Czagas v. Maxwell, 393 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981);
Department of Revenue v. Goembel, 382 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Fisher v. Schooley,
371 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Hausman v. Rudkin, 268 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA
1972); Schooley v. Wettone, 258 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); McKinney v. Hunt, 251 So.
2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); Matheson v. Elcook, 173 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). But see

Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979); Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches,
366 So. 2d 1173, 1174-75 (Fla. 1979) (Boyd, J., dissenting); Markham v. Nationwide Dev.
Co., 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Walden v. Tuten, 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Markham, 342 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Firstamerica
Dev. Corp. v. County of Volusia, 298 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The text accompanying notes 49-58 contains a discussion of courts that have held that the use standard is not
legislatively mandated.
31. 173 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
32. Id. at 166. The landowners operated an unprofitable coconut plantation on approximately 67 acres that "could have been accomplished just as well on five or ten acres." Id.
33. Id.; see also The Glades, Inc. v. Colding, 422 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
("Once the court finds a bona fide good faith agricultural use pursuant to section
193.461(3)(b), the prior or future use of the land is irrelevant."); Fisher v. Schooley, 371 So.
2d 496, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) ("It is not required that the owner be a farmer or that there
be a profit realized on the owner's overall investment.").
34. 268 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
35. Id. at 409. In Hausman, the seller, who raised cattle for twenty-two years, sold the
land to the present landowners but remained under a written lease and continued his livestock operation. The lease was subject to cancellation on ninety days notice. Id. at 408-09.
36. 258 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
37. Id. at 485; see also The Glades, Inc. v. Colding, 422 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 2d DCA
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Prior to the passage of the current greenbelt law, the Supreme
Court of Florida classified land based on its actual use, irrespective
8 the
of the landowners' motives.3 8 In 1965, in Lanier v. Overstreet,"
supreme court noted that "all of the legislative directives in this
field appear to have been designed to make sure that, in doubtful
areas, the assessment will be made on the basis of actual use to
which the property is designed to be put during the particular tax
year."4 0 In Greenwood v. Oates,41 the Supreme Court of Florida
stated that "once [agricultural use] has been established we expect
that it would be a rare situation where the claim for agricultural
assessment would not be 'bona fide.' "42
Subsequent to the passage of the current greenbelt statute,
the supreme court continued its adherence to the use standard.4 3
In Straughn v. Tuck," the court noted that "in order to qualify for
preferential agricultural classification prior to 1968 one had to
prove agricultural 'use.' ,,4" The court further noted that "[iln
1972, section 193.461 was substantially modified. . . . However, as
evidenced by subsection (3)(b) of the statute, 'use' is still the
guidepost in classifying land .
,,.In Harbor Ventures, Inc. v.
Hutches,4 7 the supreme court again pledged allegiance to the use
standard by expressing its continued "adherence to the actual use
48
test."
1982) ("[Hjaving made the initial finding of a bona fide good faith agricultural use, the trial
judge erred in considering the possible future development."); Czagas v. Maxwell, 393 So. 2d
645, 647 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) ("[Plrofit is an element that should be considered but it is not
the determinative or controlling factor."); Department of Revenue v. Goembel, 382 So. 2d
783, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) ("While profit is a factor for consideration it is clear that it is
not by itself, a determinative or controlling factor."); Fisher v. Schooley, 371 So. 2d 496, 500
(Fla. 2d DCA 1979) ("It is not required that the owner be a farmer or that there be a profit
realized on the owner's overall investment."); McKinney v. Hunt, 251 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1971) ("[Tlhe use of the land is what is involved in the Statutes, and not whether the
owner or operator was earning a livelihood from such use.").
38. Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978); Straughn v.
Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977); Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971); Greenwood v.
Oates, 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971); Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965).
39. 175 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965).
40. Id. at 524.
41. 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971).
42. Id. at 667.
43. Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979); Straughn v. Tuck,
354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977).
44. 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977).
45. Id. at 370.
46. Id.
47. 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979).
48. Id. at 1174.
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Despite the plethora of cases holding that use is the applicable
standard under Florida's greenbelt law, a number of aberrant cases
exist.4 9 Since the amendment of section 193.461 in 1972, Florida
courts have been unable to reconcile their decisions concerning the
correct standard to be applied in determining eligibility for agricultural status. Markham v. Nationwide Development Co.50 exemplifies this inconsistency. In construing subsection (4)(c) of Florida's greenbelt law, the "three times purchase price presumption,"
the court held that absent a showing of special circumstances, a
showing of existing agricultural use was not enough to overcome
the nonagricultural use presumption. 1 The Fourth District based
its holding on language in subsection (4)(c) that requires "special
circumstances" to be shown. The circumstances must indicate that
the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture use to rebut the
presumption. Alternatively, the Nationwide Development court
also held that subsection (3)(b), the "good faith commercial agricultural use" subsection required more than mere agricultural use:
"To be a good faith commercial agricultural use, there must be at
least a reasonable expectation of meeting investment cost and realizing a reasonable profit."5
In 1977, the Second District, in Walden v. Tuten,55 determined that "absent a profit motive from the agricultural use, the
• . . presumption of non bona fide agricultural use would be forti'54
fied rather than rebutted.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Bass v. General Development Corp.5 5 apparently receded from its previous commitment to
the use standard by stating that some of its prior holdings were
misleading to the extent that they held that the use standard be
49. Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979); Harbor Ventures, Inc. v.
Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173, (Fla. 1979) (Boyd, J., dissenting); Markham v. Nationwide Dev.
Co., 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Walden v. Tuten, 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Markham, 342 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Firstamerica
Dev. Corp. v. County of Volusia, 298 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
50. 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
51. Id. at 222.
52. Id. Although indicative of the theories behind the cases holding that mere agricultural use is not sufficient under -thegreenbelt law, this case may .not be good law. It relied on
First Nat'l Bank v. Markham, 342 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), which was expressly
disapproved by the Supreme Court of Florida in Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc.,
368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
53. 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
54. Id. at 131.
55. 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
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adhered to when classifying land for taxation purposes.5 6 In Harbor Ventures,57 Justice Boyd noted in dissent that
[i]f the greenbelt law and the decisions interpreting it have established actual use of land as the general test for entitlement to
the agricultural assessment, then clearly section 193.461(4)(a)(3)
[the rezoning presumption] constitutes a legislatively-mandated
exception to that test. For the enactment directs that the preferential tax treatment be denied upon the happening of an event,
regardless of actual use."
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

To Use or Not to Use the Use Standard?

The Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Fogg only increases
the confusion of Florida courts over what standard they should apply to determine the agricultural status of land under the greenbelt
law. Moreover, this confusion is reflected in the opinion itself. The
court held that a court should not employ a use standard when
dealing with the rezoning presumption of section 193.461(4)(a)3.19
Despite having thus articulated a nonuse criterion, the court nevertheless proceeded to apply the traditional use standard. The Fogg
court found that even though they rezoned their property to a nonagricultural use, the Foggs could present evidence that they continued to use the property primarily for bona fide agricultural
purposes. 0
B.

The Constitutionalityof Subsection (4)(a)3

1. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Florida in Fogg held that subsection
(4)(a)3, the "rezoning presumption," did not violate the due pro56. Id. at 482. In response to the language in Tuck declaring that "[a]gricultural use is
now and has always been the test," Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1977), the
supreme court in Bass determined that the "statement merely constitutes a recognition that
the legislature has generally chosen to classify land on the basis of use ... ." Bass, 374 So.
2d at 482. The Bass court noted that the legislature has the prerogative, however, and in
fact, prior to the present section 193.461 has exercised that prerogative, to classify land on a
basis other than use. See infra text accompanying notes 79-83 (discussion of when the legislature previously adopted a nonuse standard).
57. 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1175.
59. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 1984).
60. Id.
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cess or equal protection clauses of the Florida Constitution. 1 In
discussing the due process challenge, the court characterized the
operation of the subsection as a "mandatory presumption. 6 2 It applied a three-fold test to determine the constitutionality of subsection (4)(a)3:
[C]onstitutionality . . . under the Due Process Clause must be
measured by determining (1) whether the concern of the legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which
it legitimately desired to avoid; (2) whether there was a reasonable basis for a conclusion that the statute would protect against
its occurrence; and (3) whether the expense and other difficulties
of individual determinations justify the inherent imprecision of
a conclusive presumption. 8
The court determined that the first prong was satisfied because "it [was] apparent that the legislature's concern was reasonably aroused by the possibility of land developers taking advantage
of the agricultural classification provisions to minimize their holding costs prior to development." 4 The court concluded that the
second prong was satisfied because there was a rational connection
between the putative purpose of the greenbelt statute and that of
the mandatory reclassification of lands to nonagricultural. The
court noted that the legislature "could have concluded that since
rezoning to nonagricultural use was an obvious and necessary prerequisite to development, the statute in question would protect
against the abuse of this special tax classification 6 5 by speculative
rezoning.

66

61. Id. at 1127.
62. Id. at 1125. The court's classification of subsection (4)(a)3 as a mandatory presumption appears inconsistent with its later discussion of the rebutability of the subsection. See
infra text accompanying notes 86-92.
63. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1125 (quoting Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So.
2d 479, 484 (Fla. 1979)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The supreme court in Fogg derived the notion that § 193.461 prohibited speculative rezoning from its prior holding in Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173
(Fla. 1979). Harbor Ventures presented the Supreme Court of Florida with the identical
issue dealt with in Fogg, i.e., the constitutionality of section 193.461 (4)(a)3, the "rezoning
presumption." The Harbor Ventures court, however, never reached the issue presented because it found the statute inapplicable to the particular facts of the case. Id. at 1174. The
court held that because the landowners had zoned their property from one nonagricultural
use to another, and not from an agricultural use to a nonagricultural use as the statute
required, subsection (4)(a)3 was not controlling. The supreme court in Harbor Ventures
reasoned: "The legislature could not have intended to deny the benefits of the Greenbelt law
where a clear bona fide commercial agricultural use was being made of land that was re-
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The court buttressed its conclusion with respect to the second
prong by proclaiming that its decision was consistent with the rationale in Bass v. General Development Corp.6 7 In Bass, the supreme court held unconstitutional subsection (4)(a)4, the "platting
presumption.

'e8

Subsection (4)(a)4 required the assessor to reclas-

sify land as nonagricultural upon the recording of a subdivision
plat6 5 The Bass court held that the platting presumption violated
due process and equal protection. 70 The court reasoned that because the filing of a subdivision plat had little to do with the use of
the property, there was no rational connection between the legislative purpose "to preclude preferential ad valorum tax treatment
for property which [was] not being used primarily for good faith
agricultural purposes"' 7 ' and the mandatory reclassification. Thus,

the platting presumption failed the second prong of the test for
constitutionality.7 2 The Fogg court distinguished the Bass decision

by finding that a use standard did not govern subsection (4)(a)3. 71
An inherent defect in the court's analysis is its failure to delineate the reason why subsection (4)(a)3, the "rezoning presumption," does not require a use standard but subsection (4)(a)4, the
"platting presumption" does require a use standard. The court in
Fogg merely looked to its prior holding in Harbor Ventures where
it determined that the general mandate of the greenbelt law prohibited speculative rezoning because "speculative rezoning must
have been viewed by the legislature as a first step toward non-agricultural use,"' 7' to justify its determination that subsection (4)(a)3

was rationally related to the purpose of the greenbelt law.
This argument proves too much. If rezoning is the first step
toward nonagricultural use, then platting must be considered a final step toward nonagricultural use. For example, a developer will
postpone filing a subdivision plat until he or she is certain of immizoned from one nonagricultural use to another nonagricultural use." Id.
67. 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
68. Id. at 486.
69. Subsection (4)(a)4 provides that "Itihe property appraiser shall reclassify .
nonagricultural ...

[lhand for which the owner has recorded a subdivision plat ...

.

. as

." FLA.

193.461 (4)(a)4 (1983).
70. Bass, 374 So. 2d at 485-86.
71. Id. at 484.
72. Id. "[I]t is unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible to presume conclusively
from the recording of a subdivision plat that the platted land is not presently being used
primarily for good faith commercial agricultural purposes ....
Id. at 485-86.
73. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1126 ("with the instant section, however, use is not
the standard").
74. Harbor Ventures, 366 So. 2d at 1174.
STAT. §
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nent development because filing a subdivision plat entails posting
subdivision bonds.7 5 On the other hand, a zoning change has no
equivalent expenses. Thus, if the legislature adopted the present
greenbelt law because of its concern that certain acts create a presumption of nonagricultural use, it appears that, contrary to the
holdings of the supreme court in Bass and Fogg, the filing of a
subdivision plat is evidence of imminent nonagricultural use and,
at the very least, is more indicative of nonagricultural use than
76
rezoning.
The court's reliance on Harbor Ventures is misplaced because
the court in Harbor Ventures held, in spite of its finding that the
greenbelt law served to discourage speculative rezoning, that "[tlhe
legislature could not have intended to deny the benefits of the
Greenbelt law where a clear bona fide commercial agricultural use
was being made of land . . .,. Thus, the Fogg court's use of
Harbor Ventures to support its analysis of the second prong of the
due process test backfired: subsection (4)(a)3 fails the second
prong because, as held in Harbor Ventures, use is the standard
courts should employ under subsection (4)(a)3, and because rezoning is not rationally related to the actual use of property. 8
The Fogg court also relied on Rainey v. Nelson 71 to support its
conclusion that the use standard was not constitutionally man75. FLA. STAT. § 163.270 (1983).
76. The analysis that filing a subdivision plat is more indicative of future nonagricultural use than rezoning is consistent with the language of the statute. Subsection (4)(a)3
requires the property appraiser to reclassify to nonagricultural "[l]and that has been zoned
to a nonagricultural use ...." Subsection (4)(a)4 requires the property appraiser to reclassify to nonagricultural "land for which the owner has recorded a subdivision plat ....
Hence, the express language of the statute mandates a use standard when property is rezoned, but does not mandate a use standard when property is platted. This conclusion is
further buttressed by looking at subsections (4)(a)1-4 as a whole:
The property appraiser shall reclassify the following lands as nonagricultural:
1. Land diverted from an agricultural to a nonagricultural use;
2. Land no longer being utilized for agricultural purposes;
3. Land that has been zoned to a nonagricultural use at the request of the
owner . . . or
4. Land for which the owner has recorded a subdivision plot ....
FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1983). These subsections encompass four situations where the legislature has directed the property appraiser to reclassify lands upon the occurrence of a condition. Three out of four conditions expressly relate to the nonagricultural use of the property;
the only subsection not specifically requiring the land to be used nonagriculturally is subsection (4)(a)4, the "platting presumption."
77. Harbor Ventures, 366 So. 2d at 1174.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
79. 257 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1972).
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dated. 80 Rainey, however, is inapposite because it is distinguishable. In Rainey, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
subsection (4)(b), l which provides for reclassification of lands that
are zoned agricultural when an urban or metropolitan development
is contiguous on two or more sides of the property.8 2 In determining that subsection (4)(b) was constitutional, the Supreme Court of
Florida identified an underlying public policy interest in "as'88
sur[ing] an orderly development of the community.
The court in Fogg did not articulate any public policy interest
underlying subsection (4)(a)3, the "rezoning presumption," sufficient to condone a nonuse standard, which is insufficient under
subsection (4)(a)4, the "platting presumption." In other words, the
court determined that there was a public policy interest in discouraging land developers from "taking advantage of the agricultural
classification provisions to minimize their holding costs prior to development."8 4 This public policy interest, however, seems equally
applicable to subsection (4)(a)4, the "platting presumption" because the filing of a subdivision plat is indicative of a developer's
intent to develop the land.86 The preceding analysis suggests that
the Fogg court's determination that subsection (4)(a)3 does not violate the second prong of the due process clause is inconsistent
with Bass and is theoretically unsound.
With respect to the third prong of the due process test, the
Fogg court determined that although the landowner had no right
to rebut subsection (4)(a)3, the statute could be read in pari
materia with subsection (3)(b),86 thus satisfying the third prong.
Subsection (3)(b), the "good faith commercial agricultural use"
subsection, provides that only those lands that are used for good
faith commercial agricultural purposes are to be classified as agri80. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1126.
81. Rainey, 257 So. 2d at 540.
82. Subsection (4)(b) provides:
The board of county commissioners may also reclassify lands classified as agricultural to nonagricultural when there is a contiguous urban or metropolitan development and the board of county commissioners finds that the continued use
of such lands for agricultural purposes will act as a deterrent to the timely and
orderly expansion of the community.
FLA. STAT. § 193.461(4)(b) (1983).
83. Rainey, 257 So. 2d at 539.
84. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 1984).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
86. See supra note 9.
87. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1126.
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cultural.8 8 After the Fogg holding, a landowner who has rezoned
property from agricultural to nonagricultural may present evidence
under subsection (3)(b) to prove that the use of the property is in
fact a bona fide agricultural use.89 The difficulty with the court's
opinion is twofold: it is inconsistent with the letter of the statute,
and it is inconsistent with the court's holding in Bass.
If the legislature had intended subsection (4)(a)3 to be rebuttable, then it would have provided for such. For example, in subsection (4)(c),9" the legislature provided that a landowner may rebut the presumption of nonagricultural use where land was sold
"for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural
assessment placed on the land [by proving] special circumstances."9 Conversely, subsection (4)(a)3, the "rezoning presumption," delineates no such opportunity for rebuttal. The subsection
is a command to the property appraiser to reclassify property once
it has been rezoned to a nonagricultural use, with no allowances for
rebuttal. The Fogg court, however, affectively allowed rebuttal.
There is simply nothing in the statute that would support the
court's interpretation.
Furthermore, the holding in Fogg is in complete derogation of
the court's earlier holding in Bass. The Bass court, in concluding
that subsection (4)(a)4 failed to satisfy the third prong of the due
process clause, reasoned that the crucial difference between section
(4)(c), the "three times purchase price presumption," which was
held constitutional in Straughn, and section (4)(a)4, the "platting
presumption," was that the former section enables the landowner
to overcome the presumption of nonagricultural use through evidence of special circumstances whereas the latter section failed to
contain a "similar curative provision."92 The Fogg court gave no
88. FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3)(b) (1983).
89. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1126; Lackey v. Little England, Inc., 9 FLA. L.
WEEKLY 2448 (Nov. 30, 1984), vacated and replaced, 461 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
But see text accompanying notes 126-29.
90. See supra note 6.

91. FLA. STAT. § 193.461(4)(c) (1983). In Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc.,
326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976), the Supreme Court of Florida determined that in order to satisfy
the special circumstances criterion, subsection (4)(c) must be read in pari materia with subsections (3)(b). Id. at 423. This interpretation of the statute's presumption is consistent with
the express language of the statute providing that the landowner may rebut the statute
through a showing of special circumstances. See Czagas v. Maxwell, 393 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1981); Department of Revenue v. Goembel, 382 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
92. Bass, 374 So. 2d at 484-85. The Bass court thus concluded:
subsection (4)(c) of Chapter 193 is in fact reasonably related to the legislative
goal of granting preferential tax treatment only to property which is in fact be-
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clues as to why subsection (4)(a)3, the "rezoning presumption" allowed evidence of actual use to be proved, but subsection (4)(a)4,
the "platting presumption" did not allow such evidence.
Concluding its due process discussion of subsection (4)(a)3,
the supreme court in Fogg deferred to the trial court's conclusion
that the landowners did not use the land for bona fide agricultural
purposes.9 The supreme court determined that the evidence was
conflicting and there was ample evidence to sustain the finding of a
non bona fide agricultural use. 94 The supreme court also determined that the trial court engaged in the type of analysis espoused
by the supreme court-subsection (4)(a)3 was to be read in pari
materia with subsection (3)(b).
The supreme court noted that the issue of whether the land
was primarily being used for agricultural purposes was one of
fact.9 5 Close scrutiny of the trial court's order, however, makes it
clear that the trial court treated the issue as a question of law. The
trial court stated: "The primary intention of the plaintiffs. . . was
to sell the property; such agricultural uses, minimal at best, as
plaintiffs engaged in were only incidental to rezoning and development of the land by the purchasers after its sale." 96
The trial court failed to separate the issue of agricultural use
from the issue of the landowner's intent. It determined:
At the times material to this cause all but 100 acres of the parcel
under consideration had been used under a lease with one Joseph Bregman, cancellable with 90 days notice to Bregman,
under which the lessee guaranteed to keep cattle on the land at
all times during the life of the lease. The 100 acres excluded
from the lease have been used by the plaintiffs to pasture some
horses boarded on the property .... 9
Notwithstanding the trial court's recognition of the agricultural
use of the property,9s the trial court held:
ing utilized for agricultural purposes as of the date of assessment. The failure of
Section 193.461(4)(a)4 to contain a similar curative provision renders its test for
eligibility for agricultural classification one of intended future use, rather than
actual agricultural use as of the assessment date.
Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
culture;

Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 1978).
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Subsection (5) provides that: "'agricultural purposes' includes horticultural; floriviticulture; forestry; dairy; livestock; poultry; bee; pisciculture, when the land is
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It is difficult to reconcile the claim of the plaintiffs to "good
faith commercial agricultural use of the land" when at the same
time they were making extensive efforts to sell the land, and cooperating in rezoning procedures, at sale prices greatly in excess
of three or more times the agricultural assessment placed on the
land. 9

Thus, the trial court effectively held as a matter of law that regardless of the actual use of the property, the intent to develop the
property rendered the benefits of the greenbelt law inapplicable. 10 0
Furthermore, the supreme court's finding that the trial court
employed a subsection (3)(b) analysis in determining the use of the
Fogg parcel is erroneous. A critical reading of the trial court opinion evidences no such analysis. Even if the trial court did employ a
subsection (3)(b) analysis, the factors it relied on were insufficient.
Subsection (3)(b) enumerates seven factors01° relevant in determining whether the use of the land is for bona fide agricultural purposes. Of these seven, the trial court mentioned only two: the
purchase price paid, and the length, term, and conditions of the
lease. Because the supreme court held that no sale occurred, there
obviously was no purchase price paid. Thus, only the lease factor
remained as a valid consideration for determining agricultural use.
It is clear from the trial court's opinion that the terms of the lease
used principally for the production of tropical fish; and all forms of farm products and farm
production." FLA. STAT. § 193.461(5) (1983) (emphasis added).
It is clear that the Foggs were carrying out agricultural pursuits on the land because
during the relevant times in question, the city had granted only preliminary approval of the
Foggs' zoning application under the terms of the Miramar Planned Unit Development ordinance. Only agriculture was permitted pending the completion of the zoning process. Answer Brief of Respondents on the Merits at 35. The district court determined "that the City
of Miramar herein condoned the continued agricultural use on the property in question at
least pending its actual use as a residential development under the PUD zoning. Thus, although perhaps the cows should have gone, they were allowed by the City to stay for at least
the two years in question." Fogg v. Broward County, 397 So. 2d 944, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA
1981).
99. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642, slip op. at 5.
100. The trial court's error lies in large part on its reliance on subsection (4)(c), which
provides that a presumption of nonagricultural use arises where land is sold for a purchase
price of three or more times its agricultural assessment. The supreme court held this subsection inapplicable because the parties had not consummated a sale. Markham v. Fogg, 458
So. 2d at 1125. Because much of the trial court's reasoning relied on the facts pertaining to
the attempts to sell the land, the supreme court would have been more consistent if it had
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the land was being used for bona
fide commercial agricultural purposes. The fact that the court did not remand the case is
evidence of the illusory nature of the rebuttability of subsection (4)(a)3, which the supreme
court relied on to uphold the second prong of the due process test. See infra text accompanying notes 126-29.
101. See supra note 9.
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were not decisive of the trial court's holding. The trial court merely
mentioned the terms in a one-paragraph discussion.102 Even if the
court had relied on the terms of the lease for its holding, it would
have been prone to attack because the supreme court previously
held that the tax assessor may not rely on only one factor under
subsection (3)(b) for its determination of the use of the
property. 10 3
The trial record does not support the supreme court's determination that there was conflicting evidence concerning the actual
use of the property. There was conflicting evidence only as to the
issue of whether a completed sale had occurred. 10'
The supreme court's reliance on the trial court opinion is further misplaced. In determining the use of the Fogg parcel, the trial
court relied on decisions that the Supreme Court of Florida expressly or impliedly disapproved or that were factually distinguishable from Fogg. The trial court relied principally on three cases 05
to support the proposition that "good faith commercial agricultural
use of the land requires more than mere agricultural use

. . .

there

must be at least a reasonable expectation of meeting investment
cost and realizing a reasonable profit." 0 6 The trial court noted that
in First National Bank v. Markham, the owner's intent was to
hold the property for resale as an investment. Although the land
was being used for agricultural purposes, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held "that agricultural use of the land is not in and of
itself sufficient to entitle one to fall within the definition of 'good
faith commercial agricultural use.' "o107 The Supreme Court of Florida, however, in Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc.,108 ex102. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642, slip op. at 4.
103. Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1979); see also
Department of Revenue v. Goembel, 382 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) ("[Tlhe assessor must consider the other six factors as well.").
One could surmise that the trial court considered subsection (3)(b)7 which provides for
consideration by the tax assessor of "[sluch other factors as may from time to time become
applicable." FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3)(b)7. Nothing in the text of the trial court's opinion,
however, supports this interpretation.
104. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642, slip op. at 1-5. In fact, the district court
noted that "agricultural pursuits were being carried out on the property at all times in question." Fogg v. Broward County, 397 So. 2d at 946.
105. Markham v. Nationwide Dev. Co., 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Walden v.
Tuten, 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Markham, 342 So. 2d 1016
(Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
106. Fogg v. Broward County, No. 74-13642, slip op. at 7 (citing Markham v. Nationwide Dev. Co., 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)).
107. First Nat'l, 342 So. 2d at 1017.
108. 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
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pressly disapproved of First National. The Roden court held that:
The issue in conflict is whether more than just agricultural use
is required to establish for purpose [sic] of tax assessment that
land may be classified agricultural and be entitled, therefore, to
preferential treatment. . . . As the Department of Revenue has
done before, it stresses that commercial success is a necessary
circumstance for rebuttal. We reject this notion." 9
Markham v. Nationwide Development Co.," 0 another case cited
by the trial court, expressly relied on First National. It held that
the purchaser did not have a reasonable expectation of meeting investment cost or realizing a reasonable profit through agricultural
use of the land because he paid a purchase price grossly in excess
of the land's agricultural value. " Nationwide, however, has no
precedential value because it relied on a case explicitly disapproved by the supreme court. The trial court's reliance on Walden
v. Tuten" 2 for the proposition that good faith commercial agricultural use means more than mere use of the land agriculturally was
also unsound because the Roden court held that agricultural use
was the determinative factor under the greenbelt statute."'
First National, Nationwide, and Walden are factually distinguishable from Fogg. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in First
National and Nationwide concluded that the purchasers were not
making a profit on their agricultural endeavors because the lands
were sold for a purchase price greatly in excess of the land's agricultural value."" This failure to make a profit was decisive in each
courts' denial of agricultural status, notwithstanding that in each
case the actual use of the land was agricultural." 5 On the other
hand, in Fogg, the supreme court held that no sale occurred; hence,
profit was not decisive. Walden is also inapposite because the Second District remanded the case to determine whether the lessees
109. Id. at 589 (citing Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1978)).
110. 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
111. Id. at 222.
112. 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
113. "Agricultural use is now and has always been the test." Roden, 368 So. 2d at 589
(quoting Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1978)).
114. See, e.g., Nationwide, 349 So. 2d at 222 ("True, the [lessees] continued their dairy
operation, but the dairy could no longer be considered a good faith commercial operation
when measured against Nationwide's land cost.") (emphasis added).
115. Nationwide, 349 So. 2d at 222 ("[Tlhe [lessees] continued their dairy operation.");
Walden, 347 So. 2d at 130 ("[T]he [lessees] were in fact using the property as a 'cattle ranch
operation.' "); First Nat'l, 342 So. 2d at 1017 ("Nor was there any question that the land
had for some time been used for agricultural enterprises.").
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were making a profit on their agricultural enterprise. 116 The trial
court in Fogg never determined whether the agricultural endeavors
of the Foggs or their lessees were profitable.
Thus, the supreme court's reliance on the trial court opinion is
misplaced because the supreme court erred in determining that the
evidence was conflicting as to the actual use of the property. Its
reliance is further misplaced because the supreme court erred in
determining that the trial court engaged in a subsection (3)(b)
analysis. Finally, the supreme court erred in its reliance on the
trial court because the lower court relied on decisions that had little precedential value and were distinguishable.
2.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The Foggs also challenged subsection (4)(a)3 under the equal
protection clause of the Florida Constitution. In discussing this
challenge, the supreme court stated and applied the following test:
The rational basis or minimum scrutiny test generally employed
in equal protection analysis requires only that a statute bear
some reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose....
[T]he statutory classification to be held unconstitutionally violative of the equal protection clause under this test must cause
different treatments so disparate as relates to the difference in
classification so as to be wholly arbitrary.'
Referring back to its analysis in Harbor Ventures, the court stated
that "the legislature could have concluded that the statute was rationally related to the legitimate state goal of minimizing and discouraging speculative rezoning. . . . The treatment afforded the
instant landowners [is] not so disparate from others as to be
wholly arbitrary."' 1 8 Thus, the court held that (4)(a)3 did not violate the equal protection clause." 19
Consistent with its due process analysis, the supreme court in
Fogg has ignored its own precedent. In Bass, the supreme court
addressed the issue of equal protection with respect to subsection
(4)(a)4, the "platting presumption." There, the court determined
that given that the legislature had chosen an agricultural classification based on agricultural use of the land, "[Ejqual protection prohibits [the legislature] from singling out a class of property owners
116.
117.
118.
119.

Walden, 347 So. 2d at 131-32.
Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d at 1127.

Id.
Bass, 374 So. 2d at 479.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:549

and classifying their land according to a standard different from
that applied to other real property owners unless there exists a
valid and substantial reason for this disparate treatment.' 2 The
Bass court found no valid and substantial reason. It held that because "the act of platting, without more, is indicative only of the
use which the taxpayer intends to make of the platted land in the
future . . .those in [the landowner's] class have been unreasonably singled out for classification under this disparate standard
....

"121

The Fogg court, on the other hand, found the goal of

minimizing and discouraging speculation to be a compelling reason
for the legislative enactment. The Fogg court gave no explanation
of why this compelling reason was not also applicable to subsection
(4)(a)4. In fact, the Fogg court never mentioned Bass in its equal
protection analysis.
III.

A.

COMMENT

Confusion Abounds

Given the case precedent, the Supreme Court of Florida
should have found that section 193.461(4)(a)3, 2 2 violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Florida Constitution.
The court's contrary holding creates confusion in an already confused area of the law under the greenbelt statute.12 3 Most importantly, the court's decision has threatened the integrity of the use
24
standard.'
Whether the use standard has only been "threatened" and not
destroyed is the heart of the problematic Fogg opinion. The Fogg
court stated that the use standard was a legislative creation and
that the legislature had the choice of whether or not to require it.
The court subsequently decided that subsection (4)(a)3 did not require employment of the use standard. Nevertheless, the court applied the use standard in analyzing subsection (4)(a)3.' 25 The
court's inconsistency has diluted the authoritative value of the
Fogg opinion.
It appears from a cursory reading of Fogg, that subsection
(4)(a)3, the "rezoning presumption," is rebuttable by proving agri120. Id. at 485.
121. Id.

122.

FLA. STAT. § 193.461(4)(a)3 (1983).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 30-60.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
125. Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 1984).
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cultural use of the land. 126 This interpretation, although correct, is
inconsistent with the general thrust of the Fogg opinion for two
reasons. First, the supreme court stressed its determination that
subsection (4)(a)3 does not employ a use standard. 12 7 Second, in
determining the actual use of the Fogg parcel, the supreme court
deferred to the trial court, which employed factors other than actual use. 12 8 Hence, an equally valid interpretation of the Fogg opinion would be that actual use is irrelevant under subsection
(4)(a)3. 21 The opinion lends itself to two diametrically opposed interpretations, and thus, it is of questionable authoritative value.
By pushing the Fogg opinion to its logical conclusion, one
reaches a result seemingly unanticipated by the supreme court: a
reasonable expectation of meeting investment cost and realizing a
profit is now insufficient to prove good faith commercial agricultural use. No evidence was presented in Fogg to show whether the
Foggs were making a profit on their agricultural endeavors. Thus,
the supreme court's opinion effectively holds that even if the
Fogg's agricultural pursuits were profitable, that would not have
been sufficient to prove agricultural use sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the greenbelt statute.
Looking solely at the express language of the greenbelt statute, it appears that neither a reasonable expectation of meeting
investment nor profit are required to prove good faith commercial
agricultural use of land, despite the case law and authorities to the
contrary.' Any other conclusion would render the rebuttability of
126. Id. "After property has been reclassified under subsection (4)(a)3 as nonagricultural, the landowner is not precluded from presenting evidence under subsection (3)(b) [the
"bona fide commercial agricultural use" subsection] to show that his property is indeed being used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. . . . The procedure, in essence,
would be the same as if subsection (4)(a)3 itself were rebuttable." Id.
127. Id. "With the instant section [subsection (4)(a)3], however, use is not the standard." Id.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 95-103.
129. Initially, the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Lackey v. Little England, Inc., 9
FLA. L. WEEKLY 2448 (Nov. 30, 1984), vacated and replaced, 461 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th DCA
1985), purportedly relying on Fogg, held that agricultural use was irrelevant under subsection (4)(a)3. "Although there is some discussion in [Fogg] regarding evidence of bona fide
agricultural use, we interpret the statute and [Fogg] to be mandatory." Id. at 2449. Later,
the court vacated its prior opinion, holding that Fogg allows a landowner to present evidence of bona fide agricultural use. Lackey, 461 So. 2d 281.
130. See Markham v. Nationwide Dev. Co., 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977);
Walden v. Tuten, 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Markham, 342 So.
2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Firstamerica Dev. Corp. v. County of Volusia, 298 So. 2d 191
(Fla. 1st DCA 1974); text accompanying notes 49-58; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 12D5.01(2) (1983) ("Good faith commercial agricultural use of property is defined as the pursuit
[by the fee owner] of an agricultural activity for reasonable profit or at least upon a reasona-
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subsection (4)(c), the "three times purchase price" presumption,
superfluous. Subsection (4)(c) provides the landowner with an opportunity to overcome the presumption of non bona fide agricultural use even though the purchase price is three or more times the
" '
agricultural assessment placed on the land. 13
In virtually every situation where the purchase price is three
or more times the agricultural assessment placed on the land, the
landowners will not have a reasonable expectation of meeting investment cost or making a profit by continuing the present agricultural use. This is especially the case if they have high mortgage
payments. If the greenbelt statute required the landowner to either
break even or make a profit, then subsection (4)(c) in most instances could not be rebutted.
The legislature's failure to enumerate profit motive as a factor
indicative of good faith commercial agricultural use under subsection (3)(b) 1 2 indicates that the legislature did not intend to require it. This is evidenced by the fact that "[m]ost of the factors
set out in § 193.461 (3)(b) have been adopted through acceptance
or rejection of the various results of the cases involving prior statutes affording preferential tax treatment to agricultural lands."' 3
Prior to the adoption of section 193.461, profit motive did not
render the benefits of the greenbelt law inapplicable.8 4 If the legislature intended to reverse case law, it would have included profit
motive as a factor under subsection (3)(b).
For the same reasons, profit motive does not appear to be the
type of "other factor" mentioned by the legislature in subsection
(3)(b)7. Subsection (3)(b)7 provides that the tax assessor must
consider "[s]uch other factors as may from time to time become
ble expectation of meeting investment cost and realizing a reasonable profit."); Finance &
Tax Comm. Rep., Florida House of Representatives, Free Market v. Agricultural Assessment (1980) (presented to the Ad Valorem Tax and Local Gov't Subcomm.) (There is no
distinction between a bona fide commercial agricultural operation and an agricultural operation that earns a fair return on investment.); Comment, The Continuing Preferential Tax
Treatment Accorded the Florida Land Speculator-Roden v. K & K Land Management,
Inc., 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 571 (1979) ("[Rule 12D-5.01 of the Florida Administrative Code]
appears to complement the intent of the amendments [to the greenbelt law].")
131. See supra note 6.
132. See supra note 9.

133. Florida State and Local Taxation § 6.03 (1984).
134. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1971) ("There is nothing in
the statute to require a landowner to be a good businessman or to make a profit."); Matheson v. Elcook, 173 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) ("There is nothing in the law that
requires a person to operate a business efficiently or at a profit.").
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applicable."'1 5 Given that the factors enumerated in subsections
(3)(b)1-6 indicate the good faith commercial agricultural use of the
land, profit motive appears to be a factor that the legislature would
have specifically provided for, had it so intended. 3 '
B.

A Resolution

Resolution of the plethora of problems surrounding the greenbelt statute must come from the legislature.137 The statutory
changes that the legislature made in 1972138 appear to be the genesis of the present problems. Prior to 1972, case law had clearly established that actual use of the land was the criterion for determining classification of land under the greenbelt law. 39 The
decisions attempting to interpret the statute subsequent to the
passage of the 1972 changes are irreconcilable. 140 Fogg is a painful
consequence of the legislature's inability to articulate clearly and
consistently the intent underlying the greenbelt statute. 14
AMBER DONNER-FROELICH*

135. FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3)(b)7 (1983).
136. But see Walden v. Tuten, 347 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (profit motive is

a factor compensated under subsection (3)(b)7).
137. See generally Cooke & Power, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural Land, 47
A.B.A. J. 636 (1973); Currier, An Analysis of Differential Taxation as a Method of Maintaining Agricultural and Open Space Land Uses, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 821 (1978); Wershow &
Schwartz, Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida-RecentDevelopments, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV.
66 (1981); Wershow, Ad Valorem Assessment in Florida-TheDemand for a Viable Solution, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 49 (1972); Note, Differential Assessment for Agricultural Land
Creates a Tax Haven for Speculators, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 848 (1982).
138. 1972 Fla. Laws 571 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1983)).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 30-48.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
141. Notwithstanding the inadequacies of Fogg, the supreme court's opinion may not
have as substantial an impact on the status quo as this comment may suggest. Consistent
with Bass (although inconsistent with its analysis), the court has seemingly once again determined that agricultural use is the standard under the greenbelt statute. At least one district court has so interpreted the Fogg opinion. See Lackey v. Little England, Inc., 461 So.
2d 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Furthermore, developers who intend to develop large tracts of
land may cease to use land agriculturally in stages, thus retaining agricultural status for
those lands still used agriculturally. Finally, creative lawyers may suggest that their clients
set up separate corporations-one corporation that maintains the agricultural operation and
one that negotiates the development aspects. Of course, there is the possibility that a court
may pierce the corporate veil, thus the corporate form must be strictly adhered to.
* The author would like to thank Timothy Smith, and Law Review members Michael
Higer, Steven Marks, and Susan Robin.

